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The problem 
Forced displacement, killings, plunder and various forms of 
abuse against civilians have been a common occurrence in 
recent armed conflicts across the world, especially in Asia 
and Africa but also in Colombia. So common, that some 
observers see them as unproblematic—just another feature 
of the landscape of war. If that is ever to change, we surely 
need to understand the factors and mechanisms behind such 
violence. 
In Colombia, leftist insurgencies, born in the 1960s, and 
counterinsurgent paramilitaries, created in the 1980s, grew 
and strengthened during the 1990s. Key to their expansion 
was the income they derived from the production of coca and 
cocaine, which peaked in 2000. As armed conflict escalated, 
civilians suffered the consequences—by the mid 2000s, 
nearly 3 million people had been displaced by violence.  
How to explain such levels of violence? 
 
The literature 
Some possible explanations: 
1. Civilians were ‘caught in the crossfire’—violence was 
just an unintended side effect of war. 
2. Civilians were punished or coerced to ensure they 
collaborate with one side or another—violence was just 
another way to increase control and achieve victory.  
3. The factions were not be interested in victory or political 
goals but in exploiting, extorting, plundering and 
displacing civilians for economic ends. Armed conflict 
and organised crime became virtually 
undistinguishable. 
4. Civilians may have acted opportunistically, accusing 
each other of collaboration, prompting attacks against 
their own local, personal foes. 
The case 
Colombia is often seen as a typical example of the dire 
effects of criminalisation of armed conflict and some scholars 
have argued that the involvement of insurgents and 
paramilitaries in the coca economy accounts for the rising 
level of violence against civilians. In other words, it is seen as 
a case that confirms explanation No. 3 above. 
To explore whether this was the case I studied an outbreak of 
violence in the Middle Magdalena Valley, in northeast 
Colombia, where leftist insurgencies, right-wing paramilitaries 
and government forces have been clashing for at least 20 
years. In 2000-2001 armed conflict and violence escalated. At 
the same time, coca-cultivated areas in the region reached a 
peak of 10,000 hectares. 
Data and sources 
Dataset on armed conflict and killings, based on CINEP's 
reports; official databases on kidnappings, displacement, 
economic and demographic variables; newspaper reports and 
secondary sources; and interviews with key informants in the 
region. The data covered the period 1996-2004. 
 
Findings 
The figure below shows the steep increase in violence 
against civilians in 2000-2001. 
 
Forced displacement and civilian killings in the 
Middle Magdalena Valley 1996-2004 (per quarter)
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 Sources: Author’s dataset, based on CINEP’s reports; official displacement registry (SUR). 
 
The data also show that:  
 
1. Unintended violence against civilians was marginal—
less than five per cent. Most killings were deliberate. 
Using cross-section regression analyses of data from 43 
municipios I found that: 
2. Civilian killings were most likely in conflict areas rather 
than in resource-rich areas—including coca-cultivated 
areas.  
3. Insurgents and paramilitaries were more likely to kill 
civilians in areas with a previous record of enemy 
activity than in any other areas. 
In interviews and visits to the field I found that: 
4. Controlling the coca paste market did not entail 
massive violence—its production is labour-intensive 
and less vulnerable to eradication when done by 
independent farmers in small plots. 
5. Insurgents and paramilitaries played a significant role in 
local politics through alliances with local elites and 
social organisations, reflected in elections and social 
protests against some government measures.  
6. Although some civilians (individuals, communities, 
organisations) supported and sympathised either with 
insurgents, paramilitaries or the government, they did 
not play a major role in promoting violence or in 
targeting victims. 
Conclusion 
 
Violence against civilians was aimed at increasing territorial 
and political control—it was not an effect of the criminalisation 
of armed conflict. The involvement of armed organisations in 
criminal activities does not necessarily lead to further violence 
against civilians or entails a de-politicisation of armed conflict. 
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Notes 
Comments welcome on g.a.vargas@lse.ac.uk  Two papers 
based on this research can be found at http://bit.ly/aavGCH 
and http://bit.ly/cl0Z2I 
